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INTRODUCTION
Our purpose in this thesis is not to place John Locke and
St. Thomas Aquinas on the same

hi~1

plane.

For certainly the

philosophy of Locke, which competent historians have termed
1

"superficial",

2

"inconsistent",

3

and "devoid of force",

is not

·worthy of the same merit as that of the Angel of the Schools,
who has been aptly styled, "the norm for philosophersn, by so
many.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that Locke's philosophy has been very influential, especially in .tmglish and
American philosophy, and particulary in the fields of
ology and Psychology.

~pistem

A per·fect understanding of modern .l:!.nglish

and American thought supposes a knowledge of Locke's philosophy.
As Aristotle says:

"He who considers things in their growth

and origin will obtain the clearest view of them."

It is worthy

of study, therefore, to view these teachings of Locke, not in
themselves, but alongside the doctrine of St. Thomas, which has
stood the test of time, and is so consonant with revealed truths
our method of approach will be patterned after that of
St. Thomas.

~t

is his way, first, to set down the views of his

adversaries, next to pr·esent his own views, and then to answer
the opponents by comparison and criticism.

Our thesis will con-

sider both the Sensism and Attempted Realism of Locke, which
necessitates a twofold

pBrtit~on

of the work.
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In each section we shall set forth Locke's doctrine, next
Aquinas' views, and finally our critique presented in the light
of 'l'homistic doctrine.
VJe have intended the chief characteristic of this work to

be the fact that the criticisms are based principally on a
parallelism of text.

'l'hus in the third and sixth chapters mmy

criticisms of Locke's Sensism and Attemped Realism have not been
mentioned, since they have been brought forward by Saint Thomas 1
own words cited in preceding chapters.

-3-

Sensism of Locke

,Section I
Chapter I

AN EXPOSITION OF LOCKE'S SENSISM
By Sensism here we intend that system of philosophy which
so analyzes the cognoscitive processes of man as to reduce all
faculties to the level of the senses.

Such a system puts man

on the same plane as the animal as regards knowledge.

In the

present chapter we purpose to Show that such was Locke's analysis of man's cognoscitive powers.
The first intimation of Locke•s Sensism is found in his definition of "idea", one that is, to say the leas·t, very vague and
slipshod.
In his Introduction to the

~ssay

he writes:

"Before I proceed on to what I have thought
of on this subject, I must here, in the entrance, beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word, nidea", which he will
find in the following treatise, it being that
term, which I think, serves best to stand for
whatsoever is the object of the understanding
when a man thinks. I have used it to express
whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species,
or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking: a~d I could not
avoid frequently using it. n
Ne could call attention, here, to the idealism implied in such

1

a definition.

But since in this chapter we are treating only

of sensism we shall leave that for a later one.
this.

Our point is

Locke, in this definition, does not aistinguish between

-4-

the notion and the image.

Since the image is always of the

singular, and the notion of the universal, they are not precisely given the common name of idea.
does.

But yet this is what Locke

Such a definition shows confusion of intellect and sense,

which justifies us in saying that Locke at the very outset of
his treatise on knowledge intimates the sensism which in the
course of his .t!;ssay becomes more and more explicit.
A modern scholastic critic of the same definition clearly
corrobrates our interpretation of the said definition:
"It would be just as appropriate to call an
ox an mgel as to call a nphantasm" and "idea".
To call a concept or notion of the intellect,
and a phantasm of the imagination, two things
so totally different in their natures, by the
same te.rm --idea-- is an indication at the
very threshold of his philosophy to confound
intellect with sense, and to Illike man a mere
glorified animal. So many outstanding philosophers of the ages -- Plato, Socrates, Aristotle,
Descartes, Leibniz and eveg Kant -- were never
guilty of this confusion."
But let us proceed to Locke's analysis of our cognoscitive
powers.

It is in the second book of the

~ssay

that Locke pro-

poses to himself the question:
"How comes the mind to be furnished with ideas~ 6
nTo this I answer in one word from Experience."
But what does Locke intend by experience?

For him, as he

clearly explains, experience is twofold: sensation and reflection.

By sensation he means the perception of external phen-

omena, by reflection the perception of internal phenomena.

-5-

or the operations of the mind.

Locke is very insistent that

these two, sensation and reflection, are the only sources of
knowledge which we possess.
"These two are the fountains of all knowledge,
from whence all the ideas we have, or can
naturally have, do spring.n7
Again:
"These two, I say, viz., external things as
the objects of sensation, ~d the operations
of our minds within, as the objects of Reflection are to me the only originals from
whence all our ideas take their beginnings.n8
Once More:
"I pretend not to teach but to inquire and
therefore can not but confess here again
that external and internal sensation &re
the only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding.n9
The following is still more illustrative of the fact that
Locke wished to limit all our knowledge to sensation and reflection.
"All those sublime thoughts, which tower
above the clouds, and reach as high as
heaven itself, take their rise and footing here; in all that great extent wherein
the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it
stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which
sense or reflection have offered for its
contemplation.nlO
In fact at one point Locke challenges his opponents to
name any other channel whereby he has knowledge outside of
these two:

-6-

"Let any one examine his own thoughts, and
thoroughly search into his understanding:
and then let him tell me, whether all the
original ideas he has there, are any other
than of the objects of his senses, or the
operations of his mind, considered as objects of reflection. And how great a mass
of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged
there, he will, upon taking a strict view,
see that he has not any ideas in his mind
but what one of these two have imprinted: though perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding.nll
We have been at pains to show that for Locke all the knowledge which we possess comes to us by means of these two channels.

Our purpose in stressing this is because later we shall

prove that all such knowledge attained in the Lockian fashion
is sense knov.-ledge.

Since this is all of our knowledge, we

shall have proved the Sensism of Locke.
But first let us continue with Locke's analysis of our
cognoscitive powers.
Locke categorizes all our ideas in a twofold manner.
he calls simple ideas, others complex.

Some

Simple ideas are those

which are furnished to the understanding, by sensation and reflection, the understanding remaining entirely passive.

He will

enumerate four classes of simple ideas.
Some simple ideas come into the understanding by one sense
alone.

To this class belong the ideas of color, taste, light,

sound, odor, solidity, roughness, hardness, etc.

The ideas of

this class are indeed very numerous, and Locke intends to set

-7down only a few of them.
"I think it will be needless to enumerateall
the particular simple ideas belonging to each
sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we would,
there being a great many more of them belonging
to most of the senses than we have names for.nl2
To the second class belong those ideas which are conveyed
into the mind by more than one sense.

To this class belong the

ideas of space, extension, figure, rest, and motion.
To the third class belong the ideas which are had from reflection only.
"The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the
foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns
its view inward upon itself, and observes its
own actions about these ideas it has, takes
from thence other ideas, which are capable to
the objects of its contemplation as any of those
it has received from foreign things. "13
Locke instances the ideas of thought and will as examples
of this class, for these are the tv.'o principal acts of the mind.
"The two great and principal actions of the mind
are these two: 'Perception or thinking, and volition, or willing.tnl~
To the fourth class of simple ideas belong those ideas
which come into the understanding by all the ways of sensation
and reflection.

Thus we have the ideas of pleasure or delight,

and its opposite, pain or uneasiness, power, existence, and
unity.
"There be other simple ideas vvhich convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz., Delight or Pleasure,
and its opposite, Pain or Uneasiness, Power,
Existence, Unity.nl5

-8-

Complex ideas are those which the understanding "makes"
by repeating, comparing, and combining simple ideas.
"When the understanding is at once stored
with these simple ideas, it has the power
to repeat, compare, and unite them, even
to an almose infinite variety; and so can
make at pleasure nevv complex ideas. trl6
However Locke will reduce these complex ideas to three
classes.

Some he will call modes, others substance, and others

relations.
"Complex ideas, however compounded and decompounded, though their number be infinite,
and the variety endless wherewith they fill
and entertain the thoughts of men, yet I
think they may be all reduced under these
three heads: 1. Modes; 2. Substances;
3. Relations.nl7
By modes Locke understands those complex ideas which contain not in themselves the supposition of existing by themselves,
but are considered as dependencies of substances.

.According as

these combinations are made of the same simple idea or of different ideas we have simple or mixed modes.

Thus for example

"surface" is a simple mode resulting from the modification of
the idea of duration, and memory a simple mode of thinking, etc.
Sacrilege would be a mixed mode made up of the simple ideas of
action, circumstance, and motive.

Likewise beauty would b.e a

mixed mode resulting from the simple ideas of color, figure,
and order.
The second class of complex ideas are substances.

-9-

Historians of philosophy are not all in agreement as to what
Locke meant by substance.

However, most of the controversy

concerns the reality of substance, o point which does not concern us here.

~~at

we wish to determine is this.

of substance merely a compound of simple ideas?

Is the idea
The answer

must be affirmative if we are to accept the following words:
"The ideas of substa.nces are such combinations
of simple ideas, as are taken to represent
distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea
of substance, such as it is always the first
and chief. Thus if to substance be joined the
simple idea of a certain dull whitish color
with certain degrees of weight, hardness,
ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of
lead •••• Now of substances also there are two
sorts of ideas; one of sir~le substance, as
they exist separately, as of a man or a sheep;
the other of several of those put together, as
an army of men or a flock of sheep; which
collective ideas of several substances thus put
together are as much each of them ope single
idea, as that of a man, or a unit.nl8
It is true that Locke elsewhere states: "the idea of
substance we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflec18
However, this is just another of those inexplicable
tion."
contradictories found in LocKe's Essay.

Thus we can under-

stand why Professor Morris, translator of Ueberweg's "History
of Philosophy", from the German into the English, has this
criticism to make:
"Locke's very desire for plainness and intelligibility has rendered his style, by universal
admission,loose and inexact, not to mention
colorless prolixity in him ••• and has consequently made his reasonil16 obscure and his conclusions uncertain.~~2_0________________________________~

-10Locke will distinguish three kinds of substances bodily,
spiritual and divine.

Moreover, he will maintain that our

idea of spiritual substance is just as clear as that of bodily
substance.

For we have as clear an idea of thought as of ex-

tension, and of will as of force.

The idea of divine substance

is merely the complex idea of existence, power knowledge, etc.
to which is added the idea of infinite.

The idea of infinite

is obtained by the addition of finite to finite.
The third class of complex ideas are relations.

A rela-

tion, Locke tells us, arises in the mind,
"Vvben the mind so considers one thing that
it does as it were, bring it to, and set it
by another, and carries its view from the one
to the other,n21
For him relations are innumerable.

However, he discusses

only the principle relations such as those of cause and effect,
identity, and diversity, and moral relations.
Let us recall what we purposed at the beginning of this
chapter, namely, to point out the sensism in Locke's philosophy.
Thus far we have merely summarized his ideogeny with scarcely
any comment.

Now we wish to show explicitly that all the ideas

mentioned by Locke are merely sensuous.
We have already established the fact that all our ideas
according to Locke, come to us by the cha1mels of sensation
and reflection.

Are all of these ideas sensuous?

question we wish to answer now.

That is the

,..-·
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That the ideas of sensation are sensuous needs little
proof.

We must bear in mind that for Locke the intellect is

entirely passive.
"These simple ideas when offered to the mind,
the understanding can no more refuse to have,
nor alter v.hen they are imprinted than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the i::nages
or ideas, ,-J~:hich objects set before it do there
produce. '' ~~
If, therefore, the intellect in no way changes the sense
impressions such impressions received in the intellect are no
different than when they existed in the sense, even though
we may then call them "Ideas".
Moreover, Locke explicitly calls these ideas obtained ·
through sensations, "sensations".
"Thus the perception which hCtually accompanies
and is annexed to any impression on the body
made by an external object furnishes the mind
with a distinct idea which we call 'sensation';
which is as it were the actual entrance of agy
idea into the understanaing by the senses.n23
Are the ideas obtained by reflection sensuous?
seems to be no doubt about this.
of reflection.

There

Let us recall his definition

In the second book of the Essay he tells us

that it is "the perception of the operations of our minds with24

in us, as it is employed about ideas got by sensation."
From such a definition we may legitimately reason thus:
A faculty's nature is knovm by the nature of its operation.
Furthermore, the nature of an operation is disclosed to us by
its object.

Therefore the nature of a faculty is manifested by

-12its object.

We must bear in mind, however, that it is the

formal object, and not the material object which discloses the
nature of a faculty •.
Let us apply this reasoning to our case.

The faculty of

reflection is employed about the operations of the mind which
in turn are about the ideas 50t by sensation:
"In time the mind comes to reflect on its o~n
operations about the ideas got by sensation
and thereby stores itself with a new set of
ideas, which I call ideas of reflection.n25
The ideas of sensation are sensuous a.s we have shown above.
The operstions of the mind about these ideas are operations of
combining, comparing and so forth.
constitute the

form~:. l

Combining and comparing

object of the operations of thE mind.

But certainly combining and comparing sensuous ideas are sensuous operations.

The perception of these operations must also

be a sensuous function.

But reflection is nothing else than thE

perception of these operations.
suous faculty.

Therefore, reflection is a sen-

The ideas of reflection must also be sensuous,

since Locke has explicitly warned us of the passivity of the
understanding in the formation of simple ideas.

Because of

this passivity the mind can in no way immaterialize the ideas
it receives.
Moreover, Locke explicitly calls reflection an internal
sense.
"This source of ideas (reflection) every man

-13has within himself, and though it be not a
sense as having nothing to do with external
objects yet it is very like it, and might n
properly enough be called 'internal sense.t~6
Thus far, it is evident that all simple ideas are sensuous
ideas.

But what about complex ideas?

Are they too sensuous?

They are, and it is evident if we keep in mind Locke's definition of them, and the fact that the intellect for him is entirely passive.

Complex idess are those which the understanding

"makes" by repeatirle;;, com-paring, and combining simple ideas.
"When the understanding is at once stored
witn these simple ideas, it has the power
to repeat, compare, and unite them, even
to an almost infinite variety: a.nd sp cr:.n
make at pleasure new complex ideas."~::: 7
The "making" of the tm.derstanding in the formation of complex ideas is by no means an action similia.r to the abstraction
of the active.intellect of the scholastics.

It is merely a

grouping together of simple ideas which are sensuous.

Thus

the complex ideas of Locke must be said to be of the same nature as the simple ideas, that is sensuous.
There is one pc..ssage in Locke's
indication of his sensism.

Ess~q

which is sweeping

It is found in the fourth book.

"Everyman's reasoning and knowledge is only
about the ideas existing in his own mind,
which are truly, every one of them particular
existences. And our knowledge and reasoning
about other things is only as they correspond
with these particular ideas. So that the
perception of the agreement or disagreement
of our particular is the whole and utmost of
all our knowledge. Universality is but &ccidental to it, and consists only in this, that

--14-

the particular ideas about which it is ere
such as more than one particulc..r thing can
correspond wi'th it and be represented by. tr28
In this passage Locke clearly states that all our ideas
represent particular existences.

But sense faculties are suf-

ficient to account for such a type of knowledge.

Therefore,

Locke, in his explanation of the cognosci ti ve process·es of man,
leaves no place for a spiritual faculty.

-15CHAPTER II
RELATED THOMISTIC DOCTRINE
Our purpose in this chapter is to present the doctrine of
the angelic doctor, concerning human knowledge, not however in
its entirety, but only as regards those points on which Locke
has discoursed,or points closely related to them.

Thus we

shall be able to criticize Locke in our Third Chapter, in the
light of the doctrine herein contained.
The following points we deem necessary and sufficient to
explain, for our purpose:
1. Immateriality is the root of knowledge.
2. The nature of the intellect.
· 3. The difference between intellective knowledge
and sensitive knowledge.
4. The dependence of the intellect on the sense.
1. IMMATERIALITY IS THE ROOT OF KNOWLEDGE
It is a very frequent assertion of St. Thomas that immateriality is the root of knowledge.

In fact he rarely speaks

of knowledge without in some way either explicitly or implieitl
conveying this idea to his readers.

It matters not whether he

is considering knowledge from the part of the knower or the
object known, for him it is still true to say that immaterialit

-16is the root of knowledge.

Let us now consider this principle,

first as regards the knower and then as regards the object
known.
In the "De Veritate" we are told that knowledge is not attributed to all things but only to immaterial beings.
"Cognitio non omnibus rebus attribuitur sed
solum immaterialibus.n29
Immateriality is here taKen in the sense of eminence above
potentiality in the reception of forms.

Potentielity in receiv-

ing forms consists in this, that by the reception the form is determined, anda third entity arises composed from the potential
and the form or the act.

Thus when prime matter receives form

we have a compound, namely the actuated or informed matter.
Likewise when wax receives some accidental form it receives it
in a potential manner.

It is as a potency actuated by a form.

Such a reception of form can be called a potential, subjective,
imperfect, or material reception of form.
In knowledge the form of the thing known is not received in
that way.

It is received in a superior or more perfect manner.

No third entity arises.
to form a third.

The knower and the known do not combine

However the knower becomes the known, but re-

mains itself and at the same time leaves the object in its
"otherness".

This is what .M. Maritain styles "an apparent scan30

dal to the principle of identity."
only be apparent.

And indeed the scandal can

For we must distinguish between the order of

-17knowledge or intentional order, and the physical order.
knower becomes the known in the intentional order.

The

The knower

and the known remain themselves in the physical, or natural order.

It is only in the intentional order that the Thomistic

dictum "Intellectus in actu est intellectum in &ctu",

31

is true.

Because this union between subject and object is identity,
Averroes reckons it greater than the union between matter and
32

form,

to which Saint Thomas would subscribe.
Since such a manner of receiving forms is opposed to the

preceding way which was termed potential, subjective, imperfect,
or material, we may describe this manner of reception as actual,
objective, perfect, or immaterial.

To receive a form thus, i.e.

immaterially, supposes that that which receives be removed from
potentiality or materiality.

Hence Aquinas sums up his entire

doctrine in the brief dictum:
"Immateriality is the root of knowledge."

33

If such is the case, it will be true also that the degree
of knowledge is proportionate to the immateriality of a being.
Hence logically the angelic doctor writes:
"Secundum gro.dum immaterialitatis est gradus
cognitionis. n34
We find, therefore, descending cognoscitive powers in God,
angels, man and animal, because of their descending degree of
immateriality.
That such ideas are Thomistic may be easily seen from a
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perusal of that article in the Summa in which St. Thomas wishes
to demonstrate that there is knowledge in God.

His conclusion

is that the highest degree of knowledge must be predicated of
God precisely because he is in the highest degree of immateriality:
" •••• intelligent beings are distinguished from
non-intelligent beings because the latter possess
only their own form; whereas the intelligent
being naturally has also the form of some other
thing; for the idea of the thing known is in
the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a no~-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and
extension; therefore the Philosopher says that
the soul is in a sense everything. The contraction of the form comes from the matter.
Hence, as we have said above, forms accordingly
as they are the more immaterial, approach more
nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore, it is
clear that the immateriality of a thing is the
reason and rule of its cognoscibility: and the
mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge.
Hence as the Philosopher says, plants do not
know because they are wholly material. Sense
knows in proportion as it receives images free
from matter, and the intellect is still further
cognoscitive, because it is more separated from
matter, and unmixed. Since God is in the highest degree of immateriality, it follows that He
occupies the highest place in knowledge.n35
Immateriality, therefore,for St. Thomas, is the root of
knowledge in the sense that it is the formal constitutive reason of knowledge.

In other words, to say a power receives forms

not as a potency actuated by them but as act receives act is the
same to say that it knows.
Immateriality can be called the root of knowledge also on

-19-

the part of the object.

For to be known, for St. Thomas, is to

be received as act in act or form in form.

The purely potentialJ

being devoid of act, cannot be known in as much as it is potential.

The material, and potential are here regarded as the

same.

Hence 'it is true that immateriality is the reason of

knowledge, on the part of the object known.
That, this is the doctrine of St. Thomas is evident from
his many articles an the question of knowledge.
doctrine of Empedocles precisely on this ground.
has maintained that the soul

He rejects the
Empedocles

was composed of t.he four elements.

Since like was known by like and all things were made up of the
elements, it followed that the soul knew all things.

Such a

doctrine was false, according to St. Thomas because:
n ••• in the material principle of which they
spoke, the various results do not exist save
in potential! ty. But a thing is. not known
according as it is in potentiality, but only
according as it is in act •••• wherefore neither is a power known except through its act.n36
When speaking of the cognoscibility of prime matter he will
maintain that it can not be known by itself because everything
which is known is known by its act or form and prime matter is
considered as devoid of all form.
"Materia prima non potest sciri per seipsam,
cum omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscatur per
suam formam, materia autem prima consideratur
subjecta omni forma.n37
Moreover, not even in God is there an idea of prime matter

-20-

distinct from form, not because of any imperfection in God, but
because of the impossibility of the potential being understood
in itself.
"Si proprie de idea loquamur, non potest poni
quod materia prima per se habeat ideam in Deo
distinctam ab idea formae vel compositi quia
idea proprie dicta respicit rem secundum quod
est producibilis in esse; materia autem non
potest exire in esse sine forma.n38
Again when speaking of God's comprehension of himself, he
says that God knows himself in as much as He is knowable because the reason of His knowability is His actuality which is
the

rea~;on

of His cog no sci ti ve power.
"For everything is knowable according to the
mode of its own actuality. A thing is not
known as potentiality but as actuality.
The power of God's own knowledge is as great
as His actual existence; because from the
fact that He is Actuality separated from all
matter and potentialit~ He is knowable in a
corresponding degree." 9
2. THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECT

Locke, as we have seen wasinsistent on the fact that the
understanding is passive.

St. Thomas will agree with him, but

will remind us that there is also an active power in the intellect.

It is from a study of these two phases of the intellect

that we may grasp its nature according to St. Thomas' explanation.
The intellect is, first of all a passive power. ·st. Thomas
will be careful to point out that to be passive may be taken in

-21three ways.
"Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from
a thing is taken something which belongs to
it by virtue either of its nature, or of its
proper inclin~tion; as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill
or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is
said to be passive, when something, whether
suitable or unsuitable is taken away from it.
And in this way not only he who is ill is said
to be passive, but also he who is healed; not
only he who is sad but also he who is joyful;
or whatevery way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive,
from the very fact that what is in potentiality
to something receives that to which it was in
potentiality, without being deprived of anything.
And accordingly whatever passes from potentiality
to act, may be said to be passive, even when it
is perfected. And thus with us to understand
is to be passive.n4Q
But he will determine more minutely this passivity of the
human intellect by comparing it with the divine and angelic intellect.
being.

The intellect has an operation extending to universal
Now the divine intellect is related to universal being

in as much as it is the act of all being.

For all beings pre-

exists in the Divine Essence, as in its first cause.

Therefore,
41
the divine intellect is not in potentiality but is pure act.
But every created intellect is compared to intelligible things
as a potentiality to act.

Now we may distinguish between a pot-

entiality which is always perfected by its act, and one that is
not, but proceeds from potentiality to act.

The first is the

case with the angelic intellect, v.hich is always in act as regards those things which it can

n~turally

understand.

The
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The second is the case with the human intellect, which is in
the beginning like a clean tablet on which nothing is written,
42

and gradually actually understands

to use Aristotle's example,

sueh is the passivity of the human intellect according to Saint
43

Thomas.
However, for St. Thomas as we have said, the intellect is
not only a passive power.
intellect.

There is also what he terms an active

In this he completely parts company with Locke.

The reason for positing an active intellect is because St.
Thomas rejected the Platonic doctrine of the existence of subsisting forms and followed Aristotle who did not allow that
forms of natural things exist apart from matter.

Forms exist-

ing in matter are not actually intelligible, because immateriality is the root of knowledge.

However, the intellect is passive

and must be acted upon by its object.

On the other hand, noth-

ing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in
act.

Hence there must be some active intellective power to make

the object of the intellect actually intelligible.

This power

44

is the active intellect of the angelic doctor.

There is no

need for an active sense, since the sensible things are found
45

in act outside the soul.

Such an intellect was unnecessary

for Plato, for whom the universals (direct) are in act outside
46

the mind.
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3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
INTELLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE
Locke, as we have seen, confused the image and the notion,
from which it followed that the sense and the intellect were not
radically different.

st. Thomas on the other hand, will utilize

almost every occasion possible to point out a difference between
sense and intellect.

For him, they agree only in this that both

are cognoscitive and not appetitive faculties.
They differ first of all as regards their object.

The

sense has for its object singular things, while the intellect
apprehends universals abstracted from their material surrounding •
"Sensus non est cognoscitivus nisi singularium;
cognoscit enim omnis sensitiva potentia per
species individuales, cum recipiat species
rerum in organis corporalibus. Intellectus
autem est cognoscitivus universalium.n47
Moreover the senses are concerned only with the material,
while the intellect can know the immaterial, not of course perfectly and in themselves but ·imperfectly and by means of material things.
"From material things we can rise to some kind of
knowledge of immaterial things but not to the
perfect knowledge thereof.n48
The sense cannot know its own act.
sense is perceived by the common sense.

But the act of the
The intellect can know

its own act. Therefore, they are different:
"The proper sense feels by reason of the change
in the material organ caused by the external
sensible. A material object, however, cannot
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make a change in itself; but one material object
is changed by another, and therefore the act of
the proper sense is perceived by the common sense.
The intellect on the contrary, does not perform
the act of understanding by the material cha~e
of an organ; and so there is no comparison.n49
Moreover the sense may be damaged by a sensible object
which is too powerful for the senses.

A terrific explosion ren-

ders men deaf.; an intensely bright light renders th.em blind.
The intellect, on the contrary, is never corrupted nor damaged
by the excellence of its object.
too strong for it.

Not even the idea of God is

In fact he who knows greater things is bet-

ter able to know the lesser things.

For example, thanks to the

knowledge of a principle of philosophy Aristotle was able to
see a multitude of conclusions which the untrained philosopher
would fail to see after many examples.
"Sensus corrumpitur ab excellenti sensibili.
Intellectus autem non corrumpitur ab excellentia intellie,ibilis; quinimmo qui intelligit
majora potest melius postmodum minora intelligere. Est igitur alia virtus sensitiva et
intellectiva.n50
Moreover for St. Thomas intellect has for its subject the
soul alone, whereas the senses are faculties of body and soul.
They operate through corporeal organs.

51

In this he differs from

Plato who made the sensitive operation, an operation of the soul
alone.

52

Another difference, consequent to the preceding, is that
the intellective powers actually remain in the soul after death,
while the sensitive powers remain only virtually.

53
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With such statements we readily see that the angelic. doctor
is at the opposite pole from Locke, regarding 'the relation between sense and intellect.
4. THE DEPENDENCE OF THE INTELLECT ON THE SENSE
Thus far we have seen that for St. Thomas, the intellect
is different from the sense and superior to it.

However the

superiority of the human intellect over the senses is not such
that there is no dependence of intellect on the senses.
54

In the "Summa" he devotes a whole article

to this ques-

tion asking whether or not intellectual knowledge is derived
from sensible things.

He takes a stand midway between Democ-

ritus and Plato, following the course of Aristotle.

Democritus

has held that knowledge is caused by a discharge of images.
did not distinguish between sense and intellect.

He

Consequently,

even intellectue.l knowledge was caused in this way.

Plato, on

the other hand, held that intellect is distinct from the senses.
In fact so wide was the'gap between intellect and sense for Plat
that intellectual knowledge does not proceed from sensitive know
ledge.

The intellect for him knows by participation of separate

intelligible forms.

The senses are, at the most, occasions of

intellectual knowledge.
St. Thomas on the one hand will agree with Democritus that
the sensible things are the causes of intellectual knowledge.
However they are not the total or perfect cause, otherwise

~--------------------,
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sense and intellect would be on the same plane.

It is here that

the angelic doctor leans towards Plato in making the sense and
intellect different.

He will not go as far as Plato however in

making sensible things the mere occasions of intellecual knowledge but will call them the imperfect cause.

The other cause

of intellectUa.l knovvledge is the active intellect.
"Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause
of intellectual knowledge. And, therefore,
it is not stranoe that intellectual knowledge
55
should extend further than sensitive knowledge."
In the "De Veritate" he tells us that he finds this opinion
more reasonable which places intellective knowledge to be caused
partly by sensible things and partly from something separated
from matter.
"Rationabilior videtur sententia Philosoph!
qui ponit scientiam mentis nostrae partim
ab intrinseco esse, partim ab extrinseco;
non solum a rebus a materia separatis, sed
etiam ab ipsis sensibilibus.n56
The dependence of the intellect on the phantasms is greater than its dependence on exterior sensible things.

For, it de-

pends on exterior sensible things only to acquire knowledge, but
it needs the concurrence of the phantasms to actually know that
knowledge which it has already acquired.

St. Thomas will sup57
port this doctrine with a posteriori and a priori proofs.
If

it were not the case, our actual intellective knowledge would
not be impeded by a lesion of the corporeal organs.
testifies to this hindrance.

Experience

Moreover we know from our own ex-

-27perience that when we want to understand something we form phantasms by way of examples in which we examine what we are desirous of understanding.
His a priori proof is to this effect:

The proper object of

the human intellect is the quiddity existing in corporeal matter.

For the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing

known and the human intellect is a form united to a body.

Such

a nature exists only in an individual, and hence cannot be completely known except in the individual.

But we apprehend the

individual through the senses and the imagination.

Hence for

the intellect to understand actually its proper object it must
turn to the phantasm in order to perceive the universal nature
existing in the individual.
This of course would not be the case, he reminds us, if the
natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual
as the Platonists held.
~us

senses.

58

for St. Thomas the human intellect does depend on the
However, the dependence is an objective or extrinsic

dependence, in the sense, that the intellect obtains its object
from the senses.

It is by no means a subjective or intrinsic

dependence.
Thus far we have merely presented in an expository fashion
the sensism of Locke and the intellectualism of St. Thomas.
now proceed to a criticism of this doctrine of Locke in the
light of the Thomistic teachings.

We
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CHAPTER
A CRITIQUE

OF

III
LOCKE'S

SENSISM

As we forewarned in our introduction to this thesis, many
criticisms which we
could make of Locke's Sensism, have already
!
been brought forward and developed by St. Thomas in his rejectioD
of similar errors and treatment of kindred subjects.
preceding chapter a number of such

te~ts

In the

have been cited from

the works of the angelic doctor.
In this chapter, therefore, we shall indeed criticize
Locke's Sensism in the light of Thomistic doctrine.

However,

we do not deem it necessary to develop all the reasons for the
rejection of Locke's doctrine, but think it sufficient to point
out these reasons.

Otherwise we would be indulging 1n some

unnecessary repetition.
The philosophy of St. Thomas is based on objective evidence.
That is the reason for its merits.

Now it should be clear to

any open minded person that we, with our intellects, can perceive immaterial objects.

Thus we can grasp or understand what

virtue is, what wisdom is, and so forth.

Logic demands that the

faculty which perceives such object be itself immaterial.

In

an explanation of the intellectual process, therefore, we must
save the intellect's immateriality.

r....----------,
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0n the other hand the objects of our experience are material.

The Platonic doctrine which teaches the existence of im-

material, and consequently intelligible forms, is an unwarranted
assumption.
A true doctrine of the intellective process must, therefore,
explain how the intellect receives its knowledge from the material and sensible, leaving at the same time the immateriality of
the intellect intact.
It is precisely on this point that the Lockian doctrine
may be called false, and the teaching of St. Thomas true.
As we have seen, Locke does, indeed, maintain that our knowledge begins in the senses.
St. Thomas.

Here he is in perfect accor.d with

But in the next step he falters.

That which is in

the sense passes to the intellect without any change.
"These simple ideas when offered to the mind, the
understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter
when they are imprinted, than a mirror can refuse,
alter, or obliterate the images or ideas, which
objects set before it do there produce.n 59
The idea, therefore, will differ from the image, only accidentally.

How then can we uphold the

immateriali~y

of the

intellect, without disregarding logic?
St. Thomas, as we have seen, will admit another power,
which he calls the active intellect to extricate us from this
dilemma.

The active intellect will immaterialize the material

1n the Phantasm.

It will illuminate, so to speak, the immater-

ial and leave the material in darkness.

This immaterial part,

~~--------------------------------~
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or the essence of the material will then proceed to act upon
the intellect.

Thus the immateriality of the intellect is safe-

guarded.
Hence it is that Locke is wrong in insisting on the fact
that the intellect is entirely passive.
It is clear, also, that we must not exaggerate the dependence of the intellect on the sense.

For if the intellect is tot-

ally dependent on the sense for its operation, it must likewise
be dependent on it, for its existence.

In such a case it would

no longer be immaterial.
As was explained, St. Thomas, while he must speak of some
dependence of the intellect upon the sense is careful to point
out that this dependence is only an objective or extrinsic one,
by no means an intrinsic or subjective dependence.

Locke, on

the other hand, makes use of no such distinction, but leads his
readers to believe that the intellect is totally dependent on
the sense.
In Locke's essay there is no clean cut distinction between
image and idea, nor sense and intellect, while in St. Thomas'
writings their difference is unfolded from all angles.

Hence

from Locke's writings one would easily conclude that they were
of the same nature, but from Aquinas' doctrine there would
follow no such confusion.
Locke's reduction of the intellectual powers of man to the
level of the senses is evident to any unbiased critic.

Such a

~~----------------~
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verdict is the common opinion of historians.

Thus Fr. Mahoney

writes:
"The English mentality of Locke on the contrary,
which is wedded to the concrete, individual, sensuous "ideasn, made mown by sense experience,
and which are valid in so far as they can be
tested by sense experience, tends to emphasize
unduly sense knowledge, and minimize, if it does
not deny outright, intellectual knowledge. Hence
Lock repudiates the innate ideas of Descartes.
Thus the idea of •substance", because it is
directly and nper sen supersensible, Locke relegates to the realm of the "unknown". It is
something merely supposed or imagined, because,
forsooth, it is not an object nper se" of sense.
"Species", •notion" and phantasm he included under
the same category, that is he calls them by the
same name - "ideasn. Consequently he judges them
to be of the same nature, and thus wipes out the
clear-cut, traditional distinction, between
intellectual (species, notion) and sensuous
"ideas" (phantasm) ••••• Those statements of Locke
dispose of all intellectual knowledge in man, and
make of him only an animal. Extremes beget
extremes. Thus would Descartes make man an angel
and Lockea glorified an1mal."60
Fraser, one of the editors of Locke's Essay, comments thus:
"Locke fails to distinguish between ideas as sensephenonena, and ideas as concepts and meanings.•61
That such a doctrine has very serious consequences is easily
seen.
It destroys science.

Science is of the universal.

destroys all knowledge of the universal.
says:

Sensism

When the scientist

"Oxygen aids ignition" or "Fire burns" he is stating a

truth which is true not only now but also in the future.

For

science professes to know what will happen in the future. However, sense-experience cannot transcend the past and the present.

r~------------~
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Thus sensism is

fatal to science.
Moreover if all our knowledge is of the sensitive order the
intellect must be said to have the same nature as the sense.
Hence we would have to say that it was essentially dependent on
the material.

But what is essentially dependent on the material

is material:

Hence the human soul could not be called spiritual

Consequently it would be destroyed with the body and hence not
immortal.
From a denial of the immortality of the soul, many perverse
conclusions ensue.

Morals would easily be lowered.

For it is

the rendering of account of their deeds in the next life which
keeps many men on the right path.
Furthermore, if the soul were not spiritual there would be
no liberty in man.

For free will belongs only to one having

power to know the universal, i.e. a spiritual nature.

And, of

course, the abolition of liberty brings with it a degradation of
morals.

Thus we see that a doctrine such as Locke proposed has

far-reaching serious consequences.
Locke, himself saw that his explanation of the cognoscitive
processes was sensistic.

For, in one passage, he maintains that

matter may be conceived as thinking.
"For I see no contradiction in it, that the first
Eternal thjnking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should
if ae pleased give to certain systems of created
senseless matter, put together as He thinks fit,
s·ome degrees of sense, perception and thought.•62

r~--------------~
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He seems to believe that it would be derogatory to God to
say that He could not make thinking matter.

But we answer, that

in this case we are not lessening God's power.
cannot be, just as a square circle:

For such a being

A thinking substance can

reflect totallY upon itself, a material substance evidently can
not.

Hence a material and thinking substance have contradictory

attribUes from which it is legitimate to conclude that their
atures are contradictory since "operatic sequitur esse."

63

Locke

ill add that since we do not know all the properties of matter,
e should not maintain that it is impossible for it to think.
But, of course it is not necessary to know all the properties of
matter to say what is contradictory to it.

We know that you

cannot gather oranges from thorns, although we know not exhaustively the nature of that plant.

In a similar manner, since we

know contradictory attributes of thought and matter, we can
truthfully say that thinking-matter is repugnant in terms.
Despite the fact that his premises logically led to a denial
of the spirituality of the soul, Locke always upheld it, thus
meriting the criticism of a modern historian:
"His Essay ••••••• is teeming with contradictions
and inconsistencies."64

SECTION

II

ATTEMPTED

REALISM

OF

LOCKE

CHAPTER IV
AN

EXPOSITION

OF

LOCKE'S

ATTEMPTED REALISM.

Our aim in this chapter is not to criticize, but to expose.
~ust

as in the first chapter we brought forth passages from

Locke's Essay in which his Sensism was explicitly and implicitly
contained, in a like manner in this chapter we purpose to set
forth other passages in which his futile attempts at realism are
f~d.

The first indication of his Idealism* is found in his definition of "idean, in which also, strange to say, we noticed his
sensism.

After telling us about the occasion of his inquiry

into human understanding, he continues:
"before I proceed on to what I have thought on
this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon
of my reader for the frequent use of the word,
'idea', which he will find in the following
treatise it being that term, which I think,
serves best to stand for whatever is the object
of the understanding when a man thinks. I
have used it to express whatever is meant by
phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which
the mind can be employed about in thinking:
and I could not avoid frequently using 1t."65
Again:
"All our knowledge consists in the view the mind
has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light
and greatest certainty we with our faculties and
in our way of knowledge are capable of.n66

*

i.e. According to our contention. Professedly he was a realist.
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The same doctrine is contained in the definition of knowledge which he lays down for us:
"Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the
perception of the connexion of and agreement or
disagreement and repugnancy of, any of our ideas.
In this alone it consists.n67
The most explicit statement is perhaps the following:
·nThe mind hath no other immediate object but its
own ideas which it alone does or can contemplate.n6S
If such is the case, one would logically say that we would
never be able to know anything outside of our ideas.

A modern

scholastic picturesquely describes the predicament thus:
"What can be constructed from 'ideas' but an
edifice of ideas, no matter how you manipulate them.
Suppose there were no other material or commodity
on earth for man to work upon but wood, then all
his efforts could not make anything except out of
wood. In like manner if as Locke says the only
material of knowledge given to man, out of which
he is to construct all his knowledge, are 'ideas•
then out of the material of those ideas he cannot
fashion anything except other ideas. All his
judgments and reasoning will be confined, like a
squirrel in a cage, within the realm of ideas. Hence
the whole round of existing things outside the
closed circle of ideas - matter, other human
beings, soul, God, etc. - will be shut out from
the range of his knowledge; he will be doomed
forever to gaze, like a maniac at his own ideas.•69
We would be wrong to think that Locke never recognized this
difficulty.

For he explicitly te-lls us:

•our knowledge, ther~tore is real only in so far
as there is confort6.i ty between our ideas and the
reality of things. But what shall be here the
criterion? How shall the mind when it perceives
nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with
things themselves. This seems not to want
difticult:y."70

-36-

Locke will now proceed to solve the difficulty.

He will

begin to explain how we do come to a knowledge of reality.
reasons are multiple.

His

We will set forth a few of them, in

simply an expository manner reserving our criticism of them to
the last chapter.
His first reason is based on the Will of God and the principle of causality. He will consider first simple ideas.
"The first are simple ideas, which since the
mind, as has been shown can by no means make to
itself, must necessarily be the product of
things operating on the mind in a natural way,
and producing therein those perceptions which
by the wisdom and will of Our Maker they are
ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows,
that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies,
but the natural and regular productions of things
without us really operating upon us and so carry
with them all the conformity which is intended
or which our state requires; for they represent
to us things under those appearances which they are
fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enables
to distinguish the sorts of particular substances,
to discern the states they are in, and so to take
them for our necessities and apply them to our
uses------and this conformity between our simple
ideas and the existence of things is sufficient
for real ·knowledge."71
As regards complex ideas, all of them except the idea of
substance ca1a1ot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge.
"All our complex ideas, except those of substance,
being archetypes of the mind's own making, not
intended to be the copies of any thing nor
referred to the existence of any thing, as to
their originals, cannot want any conformity
necessary to real knowledge."72
Another argument Which Locke uses to solve this difficulty
can be termed the argument from the vividness of ideas of

sensation.

The argument is contained in the following paragraph:
"There can be nothing more certain than that
the idea we receive from an external object is
in our minds. This is intuitive knowledge.
But whether there be anything more than barely that
idea in our minds, whether, we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without
us, which corresponds to that idea, is that where
of some men think there may be a question made;
because men may have such ideas in their minds,
when so such thing exists, and no such object
affects their senses. But yet here, I think, we
are provided with an evidence that puts us past
doubting. For I ask anyone, whether he be not
invincibly conscious to himself of a different
perception (idea) when he looks at the sun by
day, and thinks of it by night, when he actually
tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only
thinks of that savour or odor? We as plainly
find the difference there is between any ideas
received in our minds by our own memory and
actually coming into our minds by our own senses,
as we do by any two distinct ideas."73

A third argument which Locke advances for our knowledge of
reality is based on the theory of Representative perception.
In other words he will tell us that we know objects not directly
in themselves but indirectly.

He assumes that ideas are images

or representations of extra mental objects.

Thus he says:

"The mind knows not things immediately but only
by the intervention of the ideas it has of
them."74
&lmming up we may say that Locke makes the idea the direct
object of the understanding, in doing which he is simply accept~g

the postulate of Descartes, with whom he had parted company

by his sensism.
~how

Despite such a promise Locke will attempt to

how we reach reality, and hence he is often correctly

r
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termed a "critical realist."

The arguments which we have

selected were those based on the principle of causality and will
of God, on the vividness of ideas of sensation, and on represent~tive

perception.

~homas,

After explaining the direct realism of Saint

we will criticize this doctrine of Locke.
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CHA.PTE'R V
RELATED THOMISTIC DOCTRINE
Saint Thomas' position as regards the object of
standing is that of a
the

id~a

d1rec~

is "the object of

realist.

th~

Instead of saying

th~ und~rs~anding wh~n

und~r
tha~

a man thinks",

as Locke would affirm, he would call it the means by which
attain to reality itself.

He will admit that we know the

w~
id~a,

but only secondarily, indirectly, and by means of reflectlon.
'l'he idea for the angelic doctor is never tht: direct object of
~he

intellect.
Th~

amental

difference

b~tw~en th~se

diff~rence betw~;;en

two notions sums up

idealism and

·~·homistic

th~

fund-

realism.

As

Dr. Noel points out this doctrine is "the corner-stone of the
7b
critical reoonstruction of philosophy.~~
St. Thomas in his writings has taken great pains to make
clear his doctrine of realism.
whol~ ar~~clv

in

~he

Summa

h~

has

g1v~n

a

to the problem, asking whether the idea is that

which we see or that by which we see.

He first shows the false

conclusions which would follow from a theory such as that of
Locke.

First of all science would be concerned with only ideas

in the soul.
"Firstly because the things we understand are
the objects of science; therefore, if what
we understand is merely the intelligible species
in the soul, it would follow that every science
would not be concerned with objects outside
the soul, but only with the intelligible species
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76

within the soul."
The second false conclusion would be that whatever seems
is true.
"For if the faculty lmows its own impression
only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing
seems according to the impression made on
the cognitive faculty. Consequently the
cognitive faculty will always judge of its
own impression as such; for instance, if
taste perceived only its own impression, when
anyone with a healthy taste perceives that
honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if
any one with a corrupt taste perceives that
honey is bitter this would be equally true;
for each judge according to his taste. Thus
every opinion would be equally true; in fact
every sort of apprehension. 11 77
The Angelic Doctor now passes to the constructive side and
continues thus:
"There is a twofold action, one which remains
in the agent, for instance, to see and to
understand, and another which passes into an
external object, for instance, to heat and
to cut; and each of these actions proceeds
in virtue of some form. And as the form from
which proceeds as action tending to something
external is the likeness of the object of the
action, as heat in the heater is a likeness
of the thing heated; so the form from which
proceeds an action remaining in the agent is
the likeness of the object. Hence that by
which the sightsees is the likeness of the
visible thing; and the likeness of the thing
understood, that is, the intelligible species,
is the form b;r •·;hich the intellect understands.
But since the intellect reflects upon itself,
by such reflection it understands both its
own act of intelligence and the species by
which it understands. Thus the intelligible
species is that which is understood secondarily;
but that which is primarily understood is the
object, of which the species is the likeness. 11 7t:S
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Dr. Kremer will call this the essential thesis of direct
realism:
"For the ancients and St. Thomas, it is indubitable that we lmow, not the representations of
things but things themselves tvide e.g. Sum.
theol. l,q. 85, a.2.J; and to know is to have
this object for the normal end of intentional
activity. The subjective intermediary which
serves to make things known is not known by
us in the first instance; its existence manifestily depending on that primary direct knowledge. ·rhis is, in my opinion, the essential
thesis of "innnediate" or "direct" realism."79
In many other places St. Thomas also brings this same point
to the fore.

Thus in the Summa again he writes:

"The stone is that which is known, and not the
idea of the stone, except indirectly by the
act of reflection when the intellect turns
back upon itself, otherwise our knowledge eu
would be only of ideas, instead of things."
In the

11

De Veritate", he tells us that which is known by

the intellectual vision are the things themselves and not their
images or effigies:
"Ipsa c ognita per intellectual em visionem sunt res ipsae et non rerum imagines. rrtU
In the same work he writes that the object of the intellect
is the very essence of the thing, although one knows the essence
through its similitude.
"0bjectum intellectus est ipsa rei essentia,
quamvis essentiam rei cognoscat per ejus
similitudinem sicut per medium cognoscendi.n82
In his work "Summa Contra Gentiles" he writes so much in
the same vein that there is no doubt left in the reader•s mind
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concerning his doctrine of realism.

Thus he will point out that

although he has told us that the idea is not that which is
understood but the means of understanding nevertheless by a certain reflection the idea is understood.
"Licet autem di:x:erimus quod species intelligibiles
in intellectu possibili recepta non sit quod intelligitur, sed quo intelligitur, non tamen removetur quin per refle:x:ionem quamdam, intellectus seipsum intelligat et suum intelligere, et
speciem qua intelligit. n8~
The only way the intelligible can be said to be within

th~

intellect is by the iaea, by which the intellect understands:
"Intelligibile est intra intellectum quantum ad
id quo intelligitur."84
The idea by which the quiddity or essence of a thing is
understood comprehends the thing in the sense of representing
it:
"Omnia intelligibilis species per quam intelligitur quidditas vel essentia alicujus rei comprehendit in representando rem illam."t15
In one of his "Quaestiones Disputatae" he is led to tell us
the same thing, in other words, When speaking of the divine relations.

.!.'here are four elements to be considered in understand-

ing, he will point out:

the thing which is understood, -che in-

telligible species by which the intellect is put in act, the act
of understanding itself and the concept, all of which in man are
distinct.
nrntelligens autem in intelligendo ad quattuor
potest habere ordinem: scilicet, ad rem quae
intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem quo

fit intellectus in actu, ad suum ~ntelligere,
et ad conceptionem intellectus.ntsti
His commentators will speak in language just as clear.
John of St. Thomas will say that in the idea the thing is known
as immediately grasped.
11

Sed in ipsa immediate res cognita attingitur.nts7

Sylvester, in his classic commentary on the Summa Contra
Gentiles, will tell us that in understanding the nature of a
stone, the understanding terminates at the stone.
"Intellectio enim qua lapis intelligitur ad
lapidem terminatur.utsts
It is quite evident therefore,that for St. Thomas, the idea
is not that which is understood, but means by which we understand.

As Dr. Noel puts it:
"The real is given us __ straight away in the
activity of knowing 11 o9

If some one would ask just what is that thing which is
directly understood according to St. Thomas, we must answer that
it is the quiddity of a material thing, Which it abstracts fram
the phantasms.
"Objectum intellectus nostri secund1llll praesentem
statum est quidditas rei materialis quam a
phantasmatibus abstrahit.tt90
As regards the nature of this abstraction a sufficient explanation was given in our second chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
A CRITIQUE OF LOCKE'S ATTEMPED REALISM
In the preceding chapter we have seen from St. Thomas' logical reasoning, that if we would say that the object of the understanding is the idea, at least, two absurdities would follow.
First, of all science would be only about objects within the
soul, because the things we understand are the objects of science.
Again, from this postulate, it would result that every opinion
is equally true.
Such a postulate, we have seen, was a part of Lockian
epistemology.

Hence all that St. Thomas has said against it may

be opposed to Locke's doctrine.
Lo&e, however, despite his Cartesian premise claimed to be
a

realist and adduced many reasons to bridge the gap

be~veen

thought and reality.
We shall novv attempt to criticize these different arguments
which he brought forth, notwithstanding that, as St. Thomas has
ahown, the feat was an impossible one.
The first argument which Locke has given in this regard is
based on the principle of Causality and the Will of God.

Things

produce in us those ideas which they are adapted to, according to
the will of God.

We can truthfully say that such an argument

fails because of Locke's own account of the nature of cause.
'Nhen he analyzes the nature of "cause" in the second book of the
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Essay" he concludes that it is a pure mental creation, having no
objective value.
11

So that whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular,
simple idea, or collection of simple ideas,
whether substance or mode, which did not before
exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation
of a cause and is so denominated bv us. 11 91

------------------------

If then cause is sofuething purely subjective, a mental relation,
external objects can never be called causes and be said to reall
produce in us ideas.
Moreover Locke in the foregoing proof assumes the activity
of matter, since he makes matter external to the mind the cause
of our simple ideas.

But when speaking specifically on active

power he doubts whether or not matter has any active power at
all.
"Power is twofold viz. as able to make, or able
to receive, any change. The one may be called
active and the other passive power. Whether
matter may be not wholly destitute of active
power, as its Author God, is truly above all
passive power, and whether the intermediate
state of created spirits be not that alone
which is capable of both act1•e and Dassive
power, may be worth consideration."~2
If he wishes to be consistent, he cannot assume without any
proof as he does in this argument that external matter has activity and is a cause in the true sense of the word.
The second argument which Locke uses to prove our intellective contact with reality, was based on the vividness of ideas
of sensation, when compared with t he paleness of ideas of mere
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imagination and memory.
The absence of' consistency is quite conspicuous in Locke'
Essay, and here again it must be noted.

In this argument he

assumes that we receive our ideas from external objects.

For

he begins:
"There can be nothing more certain than that
the idea we receive from an external object
is in our minds. rr~M
But before, he had said that we know noching but our own ideas.
How then can he say that we also know that ideas are produced
by external objects?

Moreover in this argument he admits

tha~

he directly perceived objects outside of' him, contrary to his
avowed princt ple that all our knowledge, "consists in the view
the mind has of its own ideas."
The third argument Which Locke uses to demonstrate our
knowledge of reality, was

bas~d

on the fact that ideas are imagef

or representations of' extra mental objects.
known directly the objects which

~hey

Since the ideas are

represent are known in-

directly, is the substance of Locke's reasoning.
But here again we may ask how can we know that our ideas
are representative of external objects if all our knowledge consists in the direct perception of our ideas?

In order to assert

that there is a correspondence between two things we must first
know both of' them.
i.e. the idea.

But with Locke only one of' them is known,

To say that the idea is representative of an ex-

r
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ternal object implies that we know that external object.

If

that is true for Locke then he abandons the principle which he
had asserted, with so mucl1

infalli~lity,

that the idea alone

is the direct object of our knowledge.
This conclusion is confirmed by the judgement of two philos ophers of his own .l:!.nglish school.

'l'hus Professor Archibald

Alexander sums up his study of Locke:
"The truth is that Locke failed to make the
transi tlon from the individual to the world,
or from the world to the individual •••••••
All our knowledge is really subjective according to Locke, ani human certainty .is relative
certainty."'t14
Professor Green gives the following estimate:
Only if existence w~re itself an idea would the
consciousness of the agreement of the idea with
it be a case of knowledge; but to make existence
an idea is to make the whole question about the
agreement of ideas, w:ith existence as such, unmeaning ••••• There can be no assurance of agreemen~
between an idea and that which is no object of consciousness at all ••• The raising of the question,
in fact, as Locke puts it, implies the impossibility
of answering it. l.t cannot be raised with any
significance, unless existence 1s external to, and
o-cher than, an idea.rr95
And thus we see that these three arguments of Locke can be
refuted on the grounds of inconsistency.

But we must bear in

mind that Locke was doomed to inevitable failure because of his
acceptm ce of Descartes idea:t istic postulate.
arr·ive at realism, by beginning with idealism.

One can never
Gilson brings

this out in his criticism of Descartes, Which words can very
aptly be applied to Locke and which M. Maritain calls "aurea

dicta. 11 ~ 0
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ttHe who begins as an idealist ·necessarily
ends as one: it is impossible to be an
idealist by halves. There is no need to
doubt what history teaches by so many examples •••• No one made a greater effort
than Descartes did to throw a bridge between thought and things, basing himself
on the principle of causality; he was indeed the first to make the effort since
he had obliged himself to do so by placing
the point of departure of knowledge in intuitive thought: it is therefore strictly
accurate to say that every scholastic who
things he is a realist because he accepts
this setting of the problem is in reality a
Cartesian •••••• One may begin with Descartes,
but one will end along tlmt road with Berkely
or Kant. There is an internal necessity in
the very essence of metaphysics, and the
progress of philosophy precisely consists in
an increasingly clear consciousness of its
content ••••• No man will ever win from the
"Cogito" the justg~ication of the realism
of Saint Thomas."
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c 0 NCL US I 0 N
In the foregoing pages we have seen two errors in the
epistemology of Locke ably refuted by the teachings of the angelic doctor.

First of all we have noted how Locke reduced the

intellect to the level of the senses, not indeed explicitly,
but by means of his failure to distinguish between image and
idea, and his over-exageration of the passivity of the intellect
Secondly he spoke of the idea as being the direct object of the
understanding, and then with an attempt which was inevitably
doomed to failure tried to show how we may grasp reality.

Takin1

these two errors into consideration we may aptly style his doctrine an immanent materialism.
St. Thomas has pointed out the false consequences of such
a doctrine.

The first would reduce us to the level of beasts,

destroy the immortality and liberty of the soul.
would destroy science and make truth relative.
wo,Jlc'l

The other
Moreover it

the apprehension of reality an impossibility.

Mr1:-e

Hence

St. 'll.i::omas saw the necessity of admitting a power in the human
soul such as the active intellect.

Hence it is also that he

would never abandon the truth that we are in immediate contact
with reality.

The idea we know only by reflection.

Of all the verbal jewels added to the crown of St. Thomas
perhaps the greatest was the testimony of Pope Innocent the VI:
11

His doctrine above all other doctrine, with the
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one exception of the Holy Scripture, has such
a propriety of words, such a method of explanation, such a truth of opinions, that no one
who holds it will ever be found to have strayed
from the path of truth; whereas anyone who has
attackedit has always been suspected as to the
truth. n~ts
The truth of this statement results from the fact that the
doctrine of Aquinas is based on objective evidence.

It is not

the result of any gratuitously assumed, quasi principles.

For

that reason, it is most useful in refuting errors that have
arisen after his time and will ce helpful in disproving future
erroneous doctrines.
Our thesis is an indication, we believe, of how Aquinas'
doctrine serves to refute the errors of posterity.
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